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At its most basic level, the concept of providing honest services
permeates the health care system. The ethical principle of beneficence
requires physicians to place the interests of their patients above their
own, and the physician-patient relationship is often described as a fidu-
ciary one.' The financial viability of health insurance, both public and
private, rests on the assumptions that health care professionals will
undertake only those services that are necessary for a patient's care and
will seek payment only for what has been delivered.' Even patients are
cautioned that their medical care may be compromised if they are not
honest with doctors about their symptoms, eating habits, and drug or
alcohol use. Honesty, it seems, is not only the best policy, it is a funda-
mental component of a functional health care system. Not surprisingly,
* Dan K. Moore Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
School of Law; Secondary Appointment, Department of Social Medicine, University of North
Carolina School of Medicine; Adjunct Professor of Health Policy and Management, Gillings
School of Global Public Health. I would like to thank Sara Sun Beale, Samuel W. Buell, and
Geraldine Szott Moohr for their helpful comments, and Kristin Emerson Kelly, Erika Eisenoff,
and Connor Blair for their research assistance. I am grateful for feedback received at the
Washington & Lee University School of Law Faculty Workshop Series, the American Society of
Law, Medicine & Ethics 2011 Health Law Professors Conference, the Saint Louis University
School of Law Center for Health Law Studies Distinguished Speaker Series, and the UNC School
of Law Summer Workshop Series. All errors are my own.
1. See Tom L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHIcS 166
(5th ed. 2001) (discussing beneficence). But see Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed
Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost Containment, 85 IoWA L. REv. 261, 268-69 (1999)
[hereinafter Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent] (discussing debate over fiduciary status
of physicians); see also infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
2. See MALCOLM K. SPARROW, LICENSE TO STEAL: How FRAUD BLEEDS AMERICA'S
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 40 (2000) ("Insurers, public and private, pay on trust . . .").
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honesty also forms the basis for many of the health care fraud and abuse
laws, including the prohibition on false and fraudulent billings found in
the Civil False Claims Act ("FCA") and the prohibition on paying or
accepting remuneration designed to influence health care decisionmak-
ing found in the Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute ("Anti-
Kickback Statute").
A similar yet distinct concept of "honest services" also permeates
the law of white collar crime. Since the early 1900s, the federal mail and
wire fraud statutes have been applied to schemes to defraud another "not
only of money or property, but also of intangible rights" such as the
right to the honest services of an employee or public servant.' The doc-
trine's path has not been a simple one: the Supreme Court ruled in
McNally v. United States' in 1987 that mail and wire fraud applied only
to the deprivation of property rights, only to have Congress quickly
amend the statutes to specify that the prohibition indeed included "a
scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest
services."6 This expansive theory of honest services fraud has since been
applied to public officials and private businessmen alike-although,
curiously, only rarely to physicians or others in the health care system.
In the summer of 2010, the Supreme Court used the case of former
Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling to impose significant limits on the reach of
the honest services theory of mail and wire fraud.' At first glance (or
perhaps even second or third), the Skilling case has nothing to do with
health care. The case stemmed from Skilling's well-publicized prosecu-
tion for conspiracy, securities fraud, wire fraud, making false representa-
tions to auditors, and insider trading, all in connection with the
company's massive financial meltdown. In rejecting Skilling's vague-
ness challenge to the honest services wire fraud theory underlying his
conspiracy conviction, however, the Court read the statute in a very nar-
row way that focuses honest services prosecutions squarely on bribery
and kickbacks-activities that, as we shall see, have particular salience
in health care. As a result, while Skilling is widely considered to have
narrowed the scope of honest services fraud overall, it may turn out to
3. The FCA imposes liability on a defendant who (1) presents or causes to be presented a
claim for payment or approval, (2) the claim is false or fraudulent, and (3) the acts are undertaken
knowingly. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006). The Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits offering, paying,
soliciting, or receiving any remuneration to induce someone to refer patients to any facility, or to
purchase, lease, or order any item or service, for which payment may be made by a federal health
care program. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006); see infra notes 36-52 and accompanying text.
4. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2926 (2010); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346
(2006).
5. 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987).
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1346.
7. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2907.
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have the paradoxical effect of inviting additional prosecutions of physi-
cians and others in the health care industry.
I. THE PROBLEM OF HEALTH CARE FRAUD
Health care fraud is a curious concept.' While most would agree
that health care fraud is bad, determining the scope and prevalence of
the problem has turned out to be surprisingly difficult. Depending on
one's views, health care fraud may be the reason health care costs are so
high;9 holds the key to funding the recent health care reform legisla-
tion;o or has been taken over by organized crime." Yet in the view of
others in the industry, the health care fraud enforcement apparatus
unfairly targets well-meaning health care providers who simply cannot
keep up with the sheer volume of ever-changing reimbursement rules"
and sacrifices individual doctors to a hidden government agenda of
intruding into the physician-patient relationship' -just to describe a
few perspectives.
Despite decades of political rhetoric and legislative handwringing,
8. For an overview of fraud, abuse, and waste in the health care system, see Jerry L. Mashaw
& Theodore R. Marmor, Conceptualizing, Estimating, and Reforming Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in
Healthcare Spending, II YALE J. ON REG. 455 (1994).
9. One of the key goals of the Obama Administration's Health Care Fraud Prevention &
Enforcement Action Team ("HEAT") initiative, jointly created in 2009 by the Departments of
Health & Human Services ("HHS") and Justice ("DOJ"), is "[t]o reduce skyrocketing health care
costs." See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. & U.S. Dep't of Justice, HEAT Task Force
Success, STOP MEDICARE FRAUD, http://stopmedicarefraud.gov/heattaskforce/index.htrnl (last
visited Mar. 18, 2011).
10. See Medicare Fraud: A $60 Billion Crime, CBS NEWS (Sept.5, 2010, 8:36 PM), http://
www.cbsnews. com/stories/2009/JO/23/60minutes/main5414390. shtml?tag=current VideoInfo;
videoMetalnfo ("President Obama says rising costs are driving huge federal budget deficits that
imperil our future, and that there is enough waste and fraud in the system to pay for health care
reform if it was eliminated.").
11. In the words of Senator Charles Grassley, a key force behind Congressional anti-fraud
efforts, "It says a lot when you hear organized crime has gotten into health care fraud because it's
so profitable." See Press Release, Sen. Charles Grassley, Grassley Fights Fraud in Medicare and
Medicaid (Mar. 2, 2011), http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel-dataPagelD_1502
=31295#; see also SPARROW, supra note 2, at 19 (describing the role of organized crime in health
care fraud); Jay Weaver, FBI Struggling to Catch Dozens of Fraud Fugitives Hiding in Cuba,
MIAMI HERALD, July 16, 2011, http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/07/16/2317603/fbi-struggling-
to-catch-150-plus.html ("[R]umors have swirled for years that the Castro government has
purposely trained and deployed immigrants to take over Medicare-licensed clinics in South
Florida, and then harbored them after they returned home.").
12. "[H]onest providers . . . are sometimes error prone; perhaps not up-to-date on
administrative requirements and regulations; on occasions sloppy and disorganized; often
confused by complex or indecipherable rules." SPARROW, supra note 2 at 41; see also ROBERT
FABRIKANT ET AL., HEALTH CARE FRAUD: ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE § 1.04[2], at 1-28
(Rel. 28, 2011) ("[T]he complexity of the regulations gives rise to a credible defense that
intelligent, informed professionals simply did not understand or were unaware of essential
regulations that govern billing and reimbursement.").
13. See, e.g., RONALD T. LIBBY, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MEDICINE (2008).
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serious definitional questions remain. Does health care fraud consist
only of blatant efforts to trick government and private payers out of
funds designated for health care, what Professor James Blumstein calls
"raw" fraud?l4 While it might seem a small step to extend liability from
intentional actors to those who recklessly ignore billing rules, what
about the providers who instead "game" the system by interpreting the
rules creatively so as to claim the largest possible reimbursement?' 5
Should we differentiate between illegitimate "sham" providers created
merely to bill the federal health care programs for as much money as
possible before disappearing, and legitimate providers who may find
themselves on the wrong end of a billing dispute?16 And if "fraud"
describes only those activities for which criminal sanctions can be
imposed, what then of liability under the myriad civil and administrative
program restrictions?" For such an oft-maligned problem, surprisingly
few answers are clear.
Of course, all of these improper activities cost money, money that
otherwise could and should be spent providing health care services to
those who need them. But one problem is that we don't know exactly
how much money actually is at stake. Payers traditionally audit only a
small portion of the claims they receive, usually long after those claims
have been paid, and only then begin efforts to track down wrongdoers-
a system that has come to be known as "pay and chase."" Besides being
woefully inefficient, this system is far more useful for catching legiti-
mate providers who stretch the rules; it is virtually useless, by contrast,
at finding a nonexistent pharmacy that bills hundreds of thousands of
dollars to Medicare from a fake address." Most importantly, the pay-
and-chase system only works when fraudulent claims are caught during
review. Claims that are never audited-and those submitted by "fraud-
sters" sophisticated enough to know how to avoid having their submis-
sions flagged by screening software-never are identified as fraudulent.
As Professor Malcolm Sparrow notes:
14. James F. Blumstein, What Precisely is "Fraud" in the Health Care Industry?, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 8, 1997, at A25.
15. See Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 8, at 463 (describing "abusive" behavior).
16. See Medicare Fraud: A $60 Billion Crime, supra note 10 (describing a "tiny pharmacy in
a Hialeah strip mall [that] went from billing Medicare $13,000 in May to billing nearly a million
dollars a month later;" by August, "the owners had already burned the company, shut it down and
moved on to another operation.").
17. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7 (2006) (exclusion), 1320a-7a (civil monetary penalties).
18. See, e.g., Medicare Fraud: A $60 Billion Crime, supra note 10 ("The FBI calls it 'pay and
chase."'); Weaver, supra note II (describing problem of fugitive health care defendants who flee
to Latin American countries, especially Cuba).
19. See, e.g., Medicare Fraud: A $60 Billion Crime, supra note 10 (describing Miami-area
pharmacy that billed Medicare for $300,000 from an address that "turned out to be in the middle
of a public warehouse storage area").
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The cases such methods turn up usually involve the less sophisticated
and excessively greedy perpetrators who have billed so much, and in
such a concentrated fashion, that they've made it into the "top 2 per-
cent tail" of one of the industry's standard utilization distributions.
The smart ones leave behind them no such trail; they fashion their
lies on orthodox medical treatments and don't charge any more for
not providing a service than honest doctors charge for providing it.20
By definition, there simply is no way to know how much money we lose
to fraud schemes we fail to identify.
The breadth and variety of fraudulent activities is reflected in the
multi-faceted legal tools that can be used to stop them. Health care fraud
is actionable under a wide range of federal and state criminal, civil, and
administrative laws, covering both the public and private sectors. Some
of these provisions, such as the Anti-Kickback Statute, apply only to
improper activities involving the federal health care programs.21 In con-
trast, the FCA-the source of most recent high-dollar fraud recoveries,
in part because it provides a private cause of action for whistleblowers
as well as for litigation by the Department of Justice ("DOJ")-was
enacted to prohibit general fraud on the government during the Civil
War, and has been used against the health care industry only since the
late 1980s. 22 Health care fraud also can be prosecuted under general fed-
eral criminal statutes, such as mail and wire fraud, that apply to illegal
conduct regardless of the industry in which it occurs.2 3
To the extent many of these prohibitions overlap, prosecutors have
a great deal of discretion in charging decisions. For example, a doctor
who intentionally "upcodes" a claim for services to a Medicare patient
by billing for a more complex and lucrative category of services than
were provided, or for a longer therapy session than what took place,
could face penalties that include: permissive exclusion from the federal
health care programs (thus making the physician ineligible for payment);
a civil penalty for filing an improper Medicare claim; criminal sanctions
for making a false statement in an application for Medicare benefits;
civil liability under the FCA for knowingly presenting a false or fraudu-
lent claim for payment; and criminal prosecution under the general fed-
20. SPARROW, supra note 2, at 42.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006). These programs include not only Medicare and
Medicaid, but also programs such as the Veterans Administration.
22. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006). The FCA was enacted in 1863 in response to reports of
"rampant fraud" on the Union army during the Civil War. See S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 8 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273. For a general discussion of the FCA, see Joan H.
Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of Government Harm Under the
Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REv. 121 (2001) [hereinafter Krause, Health Care Providers
and the Public Fisc].
23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (2006).
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eral health care fraud, mail and wire fraud, criminal false claims, false
statements, or conspiracy statutes.24 Choosing among these options
requires a balancing not only of program risks and objectives, but also
consideration of which federal agency should have jurisdiction. While
all fraudulent or abusive health care activities may not be equally harm-
ful, enforcement decisions at times may appear to reflect political rheto-
ric more than a consistent analysis of comparative risk.
Beginning in the 1990s, the typical legislative response to concerns
about health care fraud has been to increase enforcement by enacting
new anti-fraud laws and channeling more money to investigatory and
enforcement agencies. The trend began in earnest with the passage of the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
("HIPAA"), which defined new crimes such as the 18 U.S.C. § 1347
"health care fraud" offense to apply to those who defraud either public
or private health care benefit programs; directed more funds to federal
investigatory and enforcement agencies; created the Fraud and Abuse
Control Program to coordinate federal, state, and local fraud enforce-
ment efforts; expanded the grounds for which and length of time that
wrongdoers could be excluded from the federal health care programs;
and increased the number of activities subject to civil monetary penalties
("CMPs"), as well as the penalty amounts.2 5 Similar expansions of both
new and existing anti-fraud authority occurred under the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997 ("BBA"), the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005
("DRA"), and the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009
("FERA"). 26 The recent Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010 ("ACA") similarly contained no shortage of pro-enforcement pro-
visions, ranging from increased enforcement budgets to the expansion of
CMPs and significant amendments to the major civil and criminal anti-
fraud laws.27
24. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7(b)(7) (2006) (exclusion), 1320a-7a (civil monetary penalties),
1320a-7b(a) (criminal Medicare penalties); 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006) (FCA); 18 U.S.C.
§§ 287, 371, 1001, 1341, 1343, 1347 (2006) (crimes). Some of the latter crimes also constitute
"specified unlawful activity" under the money laundering statutes, and may give rise to civil or
criminal forfeiture sanctions as well. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 981-82, 1956-57 (2006).
25. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. §§ 247, 669, 1035, 1347, 1518 (2006))
(revising criminal law provisions relating to health care fraud).
26. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 4304(b), 4314, 4331(c), 11
Stat. 251, 383-84; Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 6031, 120 Stat. 4,
72-73 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1909 (2006)); Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act
of 2009, Pub. L. No 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617.
27. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010). The ACA went further than previous laws by also including a number of provisions
designed to provide better control over the individuals and entities who bill the federal health care
programs and more timely assessment of the claims they submit, such as additional background
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The current anti-fraud agenda is perhaps best exemplified by the
Obama Administration's Health Care Fraud Prevention & Enforcement
Action Team ("HEAT"), an initiative announced in May 2009.28 Jointly
created by United States Attorney General Eric Holder and Department
of Health and Human Services ("HHS") Secretary Kathleen Sebelius,
HEAT is comprised of senior-level staff from both HHS and DOJ as
well as representatives from state Medicaid Fraud Control Units and law
enforcement. Unlike many prior interagency health care fraud efforts,
the HEAT initiative clearly has a criminal focus: it builds on and
expands the Medicare Strike Forces, an effort led by the DOJ Criminal
Division that since 2007 has targeted particularly risky health care prod-
ucts and services (such as durable medical equipment) in cities known to
be vulnerable to fraud, initially in South Florida.2 9 One of the central
goals of the initiative is to utilize state-of-the-art technology to analyze
electronic claims data for patterns that might indicate fraud, in as close
to real-time as possible."o HEAT had an almost immediate impact:
barely a month after it was announced, more than fifty individuals in
Detroit and Miami were indicted for Medicare fraud involving HIV-
AIDS infusion drugs and physical and occupational therapy services; a
month later, the Houston-area Strike Force unsealed indictments against
thirty-two individuals accused of submitting false DME bills, including
items ordered for deceased patients."
screening for providers and suppliers, permitting the suspension of payments during a fraud
investigation; and centralizing fraud information and increasing coordination among the agencies
that share jurisdiction over these matters. See, e.g., id. § 6401 (imposing additional provider
screening and enrollment requirements); Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1304, 124 Stat. 1029, 1058 (providing for enhanced oversight for initial
claims of certain new suppliers); Joan H. Krause, Following the Money in Health Care Fraud:
Reflections on a Modern-Day Yellow Brick Road, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 343, 365-69 (2010)
(discussing importance of these control measures in fighting health care fraud).
28. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. & U.S. Dep't of Justice, HEAT Task Force
Success, STOP MEDICARE FRAUD, http://stopmedicarefraud.gov/heattaskforce/index.html (last
visited Mar. 18, 2011).
29. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Health Care Fraud
and Abuse Control Program Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2009, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE
ARCHIVE, 58 (May 2010), http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/pubdoclhcfacreport2009.pdf
(describing Strike Force model).
30. The new technology was rolled out in July 2011. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., Departments of Justice, Health and Human Services Highlight Joint Efforts to
Combat Health Care Fraud in Philadelphia (June 17, 2011), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/20l 1
pres/06/20110617a.html.
31. Carrie Johnson, 53 Indicted in Medicare Sting, WASH. POsT, June 25, 2009 http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/24/AR2009062401906.html; Press Release,
Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Medicare Fraud Strike Force Operations Lead to
Charges Against 32 Doctors and Health Care Executives for More Than $16 Million in Alleged
False Billing in Houston (July 29, 2009), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/July/09-odag-734.
html. The high point of HEAT enforcement thus far came in September 2011, when 91 individuals
nationwide were charged in fraud schemes totaling $295 million. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
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This trend toward increasing criminalization (or overcriminaliza-
tion, as some contend3 2 ) is by no means limited to health care. Similar
growth has taken place in the criminal oversight of areas such as corpo-
rate fraud, copyright law, and (of course) anti-terrorism efforts.3 3 As
Professor Geraldine Moohr notes, "[t]he cause of congressional activism
in criminal law has been summed up in one word-politics."3 4 Yet
despite the substantial increase in budgets and legal authorities, key
players such as Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA), the main Senate driver
of recent anti-fraud legislation, believe we have not gone far enough in
pursuing criminal health care fraud enforcement.
For the purposes of this Article, our focus will be on the Anti-Kick-
back Statute, the major federal law affecting financial relationships
within the health care market. The statute prohibits the knowing and
willful offer, payment, solicitation, or receipt of any form of remunera-
tion designed to induce someone to refer patients or to purchase, lease,
order, or recommend any item or service for which payment may be
made under a federal health care program. 36 Exemplifying the criminal-
civil-administrative overlap, the statute is a criminal prohibition that also
may be enforced through civil penalties and collateral sanctions imposed
in administrative proceedings.
At its core the statute seeks to limit the influence of financial incen-
tives over health care referral decisions, demanding that such decisions
be made on the basis of the products and services that will best serve the
needs of the patient rather than those of the provider-a typical demand
for "honest" health care services." This patient-protective rationale,
Health & Human Servs., Medicare Fraud Strike Force Charges 91 Individuals for Approximately
$295 Million in False Billing (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/201lpres/09/201109
07c.html.
32. See, e.g., DOUGLAs HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL LAw 3
(2008) ("In short, the most pressing problem with the criminal law today is that we have too much
of it.").
33. See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (naming Title VIII as "Strengthening the Criminal Laws Against Terrorism"); Geraldine Szott
Moohr, Playing With the Rules: An Effort to Strengthen the Mens Rea Standards of Federal
Criminal Laws, 7 J. L. EcoN. & PoL'Y 685, 687-88 nn.9-15 (2011) [hereinafter Moohr, Playing
with the Rules] (citing examples of new federal criminal provisions).
34. Moohr, Playing with the Rules, supra note 33, at 687 n.9.
35. See Press Release, Grassley Fights Fraud in Medicare and Medicaid, supra note 11
(introducing the Strengthening Program Integrity and Accountability in Health Care Act of 2011
S.454, 112th Cong., 2011-2012).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006).
37. See, e.g., Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr. & Joan H. Krause, Kickbacks, Courtesies, or Cost-
Effectiveness?: Application of the Medicare Antikickback Law to the Marketing and Promotional
Practices of Drug and Medical Device Manufacturers, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 279, 282 (1999)
("The main purpose of the antikickback law may be summarized most succinctly as preventing
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however, is only part of the story: a second, equally compelling goal is
to safeguard the public fisc. As the HHS Office of the Inspector General
("OIG") has explained, "it is necessary for the fiscal integrity of the
Medicare and Medicaid programs to assure that physicians exercise
sound, objective medical judgment when controlling admittance to this
market."" While these two goals are not inherently incompatible, they
do complicate the statutory narrative, making it difficult to discern
whether the prohibition of kickback activity is primarily a moral or an
economic condemnation.
Several aspects of the statute are notable. Prohibited "remunera-
tion" broadly includes payments made "directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind," extending beyond simple kickbacks and
bribes to reach not only the exchange of money, but truly anything of
value.39 Remuneration must be offered or paid "knowingly and will-
fully," although the ACA clarified that neither actual knowledge of the
prohibition nor any specific intent to violate the statute is required.40
Moreover, the law has been interpreted quite broadly to encompass situ-
ations in which even one purpose of the remuneration-rather than its
sole or primary purpose-is to induce referrals. 4'
The Anti-Kickback Statute is a blunt rather than a precise weapon,
an axe rather than a scalpel. It is very good at defining in the broadest
possible terms the universe of financial entanglements that might imper-
missibly influence referral decisions; it is not very good at distinguish-
ing truly problematic activities from ones that are neutral, or perhaps
even beneficial. The statute does contain a number of exceptions for
activities that were perceived by Congress to offer more benefit than
risk, such as discounts and employee compensation, and HHS has issued
numerous "safe harbor" regulations exempting other permissible prac-
inappropriate financial considerations from influencing the amount, type, cost, or selection of the
provider of medical care received by a federal health care program beneficiary.").
38. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Fraud and Abuse OIG Anti-Kickback Provisions, 54
Fed. Reg. 3,088, 3,089 (Jan. 23, 1989) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1,001).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(l)-(2).
40. Id. § 1320a-7b(h).
41. See, e.g., United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823, 835 (10th Cir. 2000) ("[A] person
who offers or pays remuneration to another person violates the Act so long as one purpose of the
offer or payment is to induce Medicare or Medicaid patient referrals."); United States v. Greber,
760 F.2d 68, 72 (3d Cir. 1985) ("If the payments were intended to induce the physician to use
[defendant's] services, the statute was violated, even if the payments were also intended to
compensate for professional services."). The Tenth Circuit has acknowledged that "a hospital or
individual may lawfully enter into a business relationship with a doctor and even hope for or
expect referrals from that doctor, so long as the hospital is motivated to enter into the relationship
for legal reasons entirely distinct from its collateral hope for referrals." McClatchey, 217 F.3d at
834. The court, however, gave no indication of how to differentiate such "collateral" hopes or
expectations from an impermissible "purpose."
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tices from the scope of the law.42 However, the law remains applicable
to a wide variety of financial transactions that might be considered com-
monplace in other industries. In determining whether to prosecute, the
OIG has said that it will look to factors that include: (a) the potential for
increased charges or costs to payers, especially to the government; (b)
the potential encouragement of overutilization (such as by encouraging
the ordering or performance of health care services beyond what is med-
ically necessary); (c) the potential for adverse effects on competition;
and (d) the intent of the parties.43
Penalties for violating the statute are severe, consisting of both
criminal and civil/administrative sanctions. Violation is a felony punish-
able by up to five years in prison and/or a fine of up to $25,000.' The
ACA clarified that the statute is a "health care fraud offense," thus sub-
jecting offenders to liability under the money laundering and forfeiture
statutes as well.45 Upon conviction, the defendant is subject to the
administrative remedy of exclusion from all federal health care pro-
grams, a potentially fatal blow for entities that derive substantial revenue
from such business; OIG also has the option of seeking permissive
exclusion in lieu of criminal prosecution.4 6 In addition, the government
has the authority to impose a CMP of $50,000 for each violation, plus
three times the amount of remuneration involved."7
Anti-Kickback allegations also may be brought in the form of FCA
suits, both by federal prosecutors and by private qui tam relators.4 8 Prior
to enactment of the ACA, courts were split regarding the private cause
of action. In United States ex rel. Pogue v. American Healthcorp, Inc.,49
for example, a qui tam relator survived a motion to dismiss on the theory
that several hospitals and physicians had submitted claims for services
furnished pursuant to illegal referrals. The relator argued that because
compliance with the Anti-Kickback Statute was a prerequisite for partic-
ipation in Medicare and Medicaid, any claims submitted in violation of
the statute were, by definition, false and fraudulent. The district court
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3) (exceptions); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2010) (safe harbors).
43. See Medicare and State Health Care Programs, 56 Fed. Reg. at 35954, 35956 (July 29,
1991) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1,001).
44. See Medicare and State Health Care Programs, 56 Fed. Reg. at 35954, 35956 (July 29,
1991) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1,001).
45. The ACA also required changes to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, increasing the
potential sentences for health care offenses based on the amount of loss to the federal health care
programs. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10606, 124 Stat.
119, 1006 (2010) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994).
46. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7(a), 1320a-7(b)(7).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(7).
48. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2006) (causes of action, including qui tam actions by private persons).
49. 914 F. Supp. 1507 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
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agreed, finding that the FCA "was intended to govern not only fraudu-
lent acts that create a loss to the government but also those fraudulent
acts that cause the government to pay out sums of money to claimants it
did not intend to benefit." 0 In contrast, in United States ex rel. Thomp-
son v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.," the Fifth Circuit rejected this
per se approach and limited FCA suits to situations in which a defendant
had falsely certified compliance with a specific condition that was a pre-
requisite to payment-a category that did not clearly include the Anti-
Kickback Statute. Resolving this long-standing debate, the ACA clari-
fied that a violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute explicitly constitutes a
false or fraudulent act under the FCA, thus inviting private relator suits
in addition to government litigation.5 2
II. SKILLING AND THE SHRINKING WORLD OF
HONEST SERVICES FRAUD
In contrast to the health care-specific Anti-Kickback Statute, the
mail and wire fraud statutes are wonderfully versatile laws that allow the
federal government to prosecute crimes involving both public and pri-
vate fraud as long as basic jurisdictional requirements are met. Both
mail and wire fraud require that the defendant devise, or intend to
devise, a scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or prop-
erty by means of false or fraudulent pretenses." Mail fraud additionally
requires the use of the United States mail or a private or commercial
interstate carrier in furtherance of the scheme, while wire fraud requires
the use of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or for-
eign commerce.
Mail and wire fraud cases generally fall into three categories,
involving a scheme or artifice to defraud the victim of: (1) tangible prop-
erty, such as money; (2) intangible property, such as information or
intellectual property; or (3) the intangible right to honest services.
A cognizable scheme to defraud . . . requires (at least) proof of: (1)
fraud-i.e., the defendant, acting with an intent to defraud, either
made a material misstatement or failed to disclose material informa-
tion in the face of a legal duty; and (2) a cognizable object of that
fraud-i.e., either the deprivation of the victim's money or property
... or some right the victim claimed to the defendant's honest ser-
50. Id. at 1513.
51. 125 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1997).
52. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6402(f), 124 Stat.
119, 759 (2010) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g) (2006)).
53. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006).
54. Id.
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vices . . . .5
While intangible rights cases date back to the early 1900s, prosecutions
were derailed in 1987 when the Supreme Court ruled in McNally v.
United States that the statutes applied only to the deprivation of property
rights." In response, Congress quickly enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1346 to
clarify that the statutes did indeed prohibit "a scheme or artifice to
deprive another of the intangible right of honest services."5 7  The
amendment offered no definition of honest services, however, nor any
other indication as to when the prohibition might apply.
The structure of the honest services variant, sometimes called
"fiduciary fraud," is distinct from traditional forms of mail and wire
fraud. In a traditional case, there is both simplicity and symmetry of
harm and benefit: the perpetrator's scheme defrauds the victim of money
or property. Intangible rights cases depart dramatically from that model
by eliminating the requirement that the victim suffer a financial loss to
the perpetrator, in what might best be described as a form of "triangu-
lated" harm.
In classic fraudulent schemes, the actor defrauds a victim of money
or property by misrepresenting a material fact. The victim suffers a
loss of money or property and the perpetrator benefits by the amount
of the loss. In contrast, fiduciary fraud, which may be perpetrated by
a failure to disclose a material fact, deprives the principal of a right to
the fiduciary's honest and faithful services. Such cases typically
occur when the fiduciary receives a benefit from a third party . . .
even though the fiduciary has not misled the third party. Theoreti-
cally, the arrangement between the fiduciary and the third party
deprives the victim of a right to the intangible value of the fiduciary's
faithful and loyal services.
55. Julie R. O'Sullivan, Honest-Services Fraud: A (Vague) Threat to Millions of Blissfully
Unaware (and Non-Culpable) American Workers, 63 VAND. L. REv. EN BANc 23, 30-31 (2010).
56. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987). The Court later clarified that the
statutes did reach deprivations of intangible property, Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19
(1987), a phrase that has proven similarly difficult to define. See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States,
531 U.S. 12 (2000) (holding that state licenses to operate video poker machines were not property
under the mail fraud statute because such licenses did not constitute property in the hands of the
State).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
58. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to
Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 163 (1994) [hereinafter Moohr, Mail Fraud and the
Intangible Rights Doctrine]; see also Samuel W. Buell, The Court's Fraud Dud, 6 DuKE J.
CONsT. L. & PUB. POL'Y 31, 41 (2010) (describing this as "triangular fraud"). The Supreme Court
originally granted certiorari in a companion case to Skilling, Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct.
2963 (2010), to determine whether § 1346 requires that the defendant's scheme contemplate
economic harm to the victim. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Black v. United States, 130 S. Ct.
2963 (2010) (No. 08-876). However, the Court ultimately vacated and remanded Black in light of
Skilling without addressing this issue.
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Honest services fraud still requires use of the mails or wires, although
few cases appear to rise or fall on these grounds alone.
A. Criticism of the Doctrine
The honest services theory of fraud has long been criticized by
legal commentators.59 Perhaps the most salient criticism is that the core
concept of an "intangible right of honest services" is unconstitutionally
vague (the basis, in fact, for Jeffrey Skilling's own appeal).60 As
explained by the Supreme Court, "[t]o satisfy due process, 'a penal stat-
ute [must] define the criminal offense [1] with sufficient definiteness
that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and [2]
in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.' "61 Critics charge that the language of § 1346 provides lit-
tle notice to would-be wrongdoers and few if any limits on the charging
discretion of prosecutors-a state of affairs Professor Julie O'Sullivan
has characterized as "vagueness on steroids."6 2 The problem is magni-
fied by the inchoate nature of the crime, as well as the fact that the
jurisdictional element can be established by a mailing or wire transmis-
sion that is itself legal.63
Concerns over vagueness are exacerbated by the diversity of views
concerning the basic elements of the crime. As Professor O'Sullivan
quips, "when courts (let alone ordinary citizens) cannot agree on what
conduct-attended by what mental state and what attendant circum-
stances-constitutes a crime, it is a vagueness trifecta." 6 4 The literature
is replete with discussions of potential limiting principles that might
ameliorate these problems. Among the primary points of contention are
the nature of the underlying fiduciary relationship, the nature of the pro-
hibited conduct, the requisite harm, the perpetrator's intent, and the
effect of the breach on the victim's interests, as well as basic principles
of federalism.
59. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration of the Public!
Private Distinction, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 427, 432 (1998) [hereinafter Coffee, Modern Mail
Fraud]; David Mills & Robert Weisberg, Corrupting the Harm Requirement in White Collar
Crime, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (2008); Moohr, Playing With the Rules, supra note 33; Moohr,
Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine, supra note 58; Donald V. Morano, The Mail-
Fraud Statute: A Procrustean Bed, 14 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 45 (1980); O'Sullivan, supra note
55.
60. Skilling v. United States,130 S. Ct. 2896, 2926-28 (2010).
61. Id. at 2927-28 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).
62. O'Sullivan, supra note 55, at 26; see also Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights
Doctrine, supra note 58, at 178-83, 187-99 (noting that vagueness similarly encourages judicial
crime creation, a violation of the Separation of Powers doctrine).
63. O'Sullivan, supra note 55, at 42.
64. Id. at 30.
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1. UNDERLYING FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP. Honest services fraud
is actionable only when the perpetrator owes a heightened duty, such as
a duty of loyalty, to the victim; in the words of the Ninth Circuit, "there
must be a legally enforceable right to have another provide honest ser-
vices."6 5 In many (but not all) cases that duty is grounded in a fiduciary
relationship, although neither the statute nor cases define the universe of
fiduciary duties that will suffice.66 Indeed, the concept of a "fiduciary" is
granted almost talismanic significance in most discussions of honest ser-
vices, despite the fact that its meaning varies widely.
Fiduciary duty, after all, is not a one-size-fits-all concept. The duties
of a fiduciary depend almost entirely on the kind of fiduciary she is.
To say that someone has a "fiduciary duty" is simply to say that the
law has decided she has more duties than the man on the street.67
While courts have acknowledged that "[n]ot every breach of every fidu-
ciary duty works a criminal fraud," 68 few guiding principles have
emerged and the issue most often is resolved based on the specific facts
of each case.
2. NATURE OF PROHIBITED CONDUCT. The failure to define the
requisite fiduciary duty, coupled with the inchoate nature of the mail and
wire fraud crimes, contribute to uncertainty regarding the nature of the
criminal conduct. In short, what exactly must a fiduciary do, or fail to
do, to violate the law? Fraud generally requires some type of "trickery or
deceit" by the defendant in order to accomplish a goal. In honest ser-
vices fraud, this deception is not so much the underlying breach of fidu-
ciary duty as it is the failure to disclose that breach to the employer,
citizenry, or other principal to whom the duty is owed.' As Professor
John Coffee explains, "the fiduciary breach [is] the means to an ultimate
end and not the end itself."o The cases are unclear, however, as to
65. United States v. Milovanovic, 627 F.3d 405, 412 (9th Cir. 2010).
66. Compare id. at 409 n.11 (noting debate), and id. at 413 (proof of fiduciary relationship
not required), with United States v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491, 499 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (requiring "a
fiduciary relationship between the victim and the accused"); see also Offices of U.S. Attorneys,
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Criminal Resource Manual, U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, § 947, http://www.
justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/crm00947.htm ("It may follow that to
defraud one of the 'right to honest services' would generally require a fiduciary relationship that
creates the right to provide or protect honest services.").
67. Buell, supra note 58, at 39.
68. United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 1973) (finding breach because actual
fraud had occurred).
69. Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine, supra note 58, at 160-61.
70. John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of
Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
117, 167 (1981) [hereinafter Coffee, From Tort to Crime]; O'Sullivan, supra note 55, at 43-44
("Again, the fiction is that it is not the breach of duty ... that is actionable, it is the failure to tell
the employer about such breaches that constitutes criminal 'fraud.'"). Yet the case law "has not
always been clear whether the deception lies in the breach of fiduciary duty, the omission of
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whether only serious breaches qualify, or whether the failure to disclose
almost any breach will suffice-as well as what circumstances will
impose a duty to disclose in the first place.7 ' As applied to the public
sector, there is still further debate as to whether § 1346 must be predi-
cated on an independent violation of state law by the defendant, rather
than on violation of some intrinsic duty of honesty.72 These questions
may turn out to have particular salience in the Anti-Kickback context.
3. HARM. Intangible rights cases target injuries that go beyond
traditional financial harm: "By definition, honest-services fraud requires
no actual harm to the employer be shown (if there were economic harm,
it would have been charged as a money-or-property case)."7 ' The pros-
pect of untethering mail and wire fraud from any tangible injury, how-
ever, has given pause to many commentators. David Mills and Robert
Weisberg, for example, lament that the "law has loosened any require-
ment of an identifiable harm other than a mistrust-inducing breach of
fiduciary loyalty."7 4 Many argue that the statute must be read to incorpo-
rate an actual harm standard, meaning that no prosecution will lie with-
out proof that actual harm at least was contemplated by the defendant.
But a focus on actual harm may eclipse the underlying goal of § 1346,
which was, after all, "to extend the statute to cases not involving
schemes to obtain money or property but involving a breach of the duty
of honest services." 7 6
failing to disclose that breach, or some [other] indicia of fraud." Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail
Fraud Meets Criminal Theory, 67 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 19 n.104 (1998).
71. O'Sullivan, supra note 55, at 32-34.
72. Compare United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 735 (5th Cir. 1997) (requiring state
official to owe duty under state law) with United States v. Hasner, 340 F.3d 1261, 1269 (11th Cir.
2003) (proof of state law violation by public official not required). This debate has led some to
question whether the same analysis is appropriate for public and private fiduciaries. See Coffee,
Modem Mail Fraud, supra note 59, at 432 (advocating that § 1346 be construed according to state
law for private fiduciaries but according to federal common law for public fiduciaries). The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in a third honest services case that squarely posed the question
of whether a violation of state law is required for public sector cases, but as in Black, vacated and
remanded the case in light of Skilling. See Weyhrauch v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
73. O'Sullivan, supra note 55, at 36. See generally Alice Anne Stephens, Note, The Evolution
of the Harm Requirement in Honest Services Fraud, 36 AM. J. CRM. L. 71 (2008).
74. Mills & Weisberg, supra note 59, at 1446. The authors fear the trend is to view the market
as the ultimate victim, reconfiguring the statute into "a kind of reckless endangerment of
capitalism." Id. at 1427; see also David W. Mills & Robert Weisberg, Honest Services, STAN.
LAW., Nov. 8, 2010, http://stanfordlawyer.law.stanford.edu/2010/ll /honest-services/ (lamenting
"the continuing absence of any role for harm") [hereinafter Mills & Weinberg, Honest Services].
75. See Coffee, Modem Mail Fraud, supra note 59, at 450-51 (explaining and rejecting
actual harm standard); Morano, supra note 59, at 49-50 (arguing that prosecution should not be
allowed if the victim was able to strike a bargain "well within the going rate," even if the fraud
prevented him from making a better bargain); see also United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436 (8th Cir.
1996).
76. Sara Sun Beale, An Honest Services Debate, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 251, 266 (2010).
377
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
4. INTENT. Even if honest services fraud requires no proof that
tangible harm has occurred, a crime nevertheless requires proof of some
criminal intent. Mail and wire fraud require a specific intent to defraud,
which has been explained as an intent to deceive, coupled with the intent
to deprive the victim of the right to honest services.7 1 In practice, how-
ever, the defendant's intent to deceive often is inferred from his or her
underlying failure to disclose the fiduciary breach, making the intent
element not only circular but also exceedingly easy to prove." Due to
the inchoate nature of the crime, this weakened mens rea standard raises
the specter that a defendant may be convicted on the basis of a "scheme"
alone-or in other words, for mere thoughts. Thus, many commentators
argue that the crime should be read to require proof of an intent to injure
or harm, not simply an intent to deceive.79
5. EFFECT OF BREACH ON VICTIM'S INTERESTS. Overarching
vagueness concerns, combined with the debates over harm and intent,
have led to calls for rules that might limit the expansive reach of the
statutes, primarily by requiring a tighter link between the fiduciary's
misconduct and the victim's interests-in essence, requiring some proof
that the misbehavior actually mattered to the victim. The two most pop-
ular competing theories have been: (1) the reasonably foreseeable harm
test, which requires the government to "show that it was 'reasonably
foreseeable that the scheme could cause some economic or pecuniary
harm to the victims"'so and (2) the materiality test, familiar from other
fraud contexts, which requires instead that the misrepresentation or non-
disclosure have "'the natural tendency to influence or [be] capable of
influencing the employer to change his behavior."'"' Another approach,
characterized by Professor John Coffee as the "honest services"
approach, focuses on whether the breach truly deprived the victim of a
service to which he or she was entitled: "Under this formula, if the
defendant employee has performed the same services-no more, no
less-that a totally honest employee would have performed, there has
been no deprivation of honest services even if a conflict or a side pay-
77. O'Sullivan, supra note 55, at 35-36.
78. Id. at 37.
79. Id. at 42-43; Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine, supra note 58, at
205 (arguing that the statute should require independent evidence of an intent to cause serious
harm, beyond proof of the basic breach of fiduciary duty).
80. O'Sullivan, supra note 55, at 39 (citations omitted); see also Coffee, From Tort to Crime,
supra note 70, at 124 (requiring proximate causation).
81. O'Sullivan, supra note 55, at 39-40 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25
(1999) (holding materiality to be an element of the mail, wire and bank fraud statutes)); see also
Mills & Weisberg, supra note 59, at 1395 (noting "that even though the ultimate economic gain to
defraud and cause a loss to a victim need not have occurred, the deceptive representations must be
material to the contemplated transaction").
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ment was not disclosed."82 These approaches, however, have been criti-
cized as lacking a statutory basis and failing to provide enough structure
to effectively cabin prosecutorial discretion.
Finally, although not at issue in most health care honest services
cases, in public sector cases the doctrine has been accused of violating
federalism principles by encouraging the federal government to step in
to prosecute state and local political corruption in the face of state inac-
tion. Although some posit that federal intervention is necessary when
intrastate conflicts of interest or power struggles prevent states from tak-
ing action against corruption, such federal efforts may interfere with
state and local autonomy by forcing state prosecutors and politicians to
respond to federal concerns rather than those of state residents.8 4 With-
out adequate limits on when the doctrine can be used, some fear that the
statute may tempt federal prosecutors to infringe on First Amendment
rights to free speech and association by interfering with local political
disputes, "creat[ing] a danger to the political process that may eclipse
the danger posed by corrupt officials."8 5
B. Skilling's Place in the Debate
Into this remarkably complex fray came the 2010 Skilling decision.
In his appeal, Jeffrey Skilling asserted that the honest services theory of
fraud was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to adequately define
the prohibited behavior and thus granted law enforcement, prosecutors,
judges, and juries nearly unfettered discretion. 6 Led by Justice Gins-
burg, the Court declined to overturn the statute, favoring instead a path
that would "construe, not condemn, Congress' enactments."" The Court
did so by determining that Congress had a clear intention in enacting
§ 1346: to return to the state of the law prior to the 1987 McNally deci-
sion." Acknowledging that the "decisions preceding McNally were not
82. Coffee, Modern Mail Fraud, supra note 59, at 452; see also United States v. Milovanovic,
627 F.3d 405, 412 (9th Cir. 2010) (statute applies only to "deprivation of services the value of
which depends on their being performed honestly"); United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069,
1076 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[T]he government must not merely indicate wrongdoing by a public
official, but must also demonstrate that the wrongdoing at issue is intended to prevent or call into
question the proper or impartial performance of that public servant's official duties.").
83. Coffee, Modern Mail Fraud, supra note 59, at 449-52; O'Sullivan, supra note 55, at
38-41.
84. Beale, supra note 76, at 261, 265-66 (addressing debate); Coffee, From Tort to Crime,
supra note 70, at 169-72 (questioning "whether there really is a federal interest in disciplining
fiduciaries" despite concerns over "state incapacity"); Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible
Rights Doctrine, supra note 58, at 175-78, 183-87 (noting federalism concems).
85. Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine, supra note 58, at 181.
86. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2928 (2010).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2928-29 (citing McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987)).
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models of clarity or consistency," the Court nevertheless determined that
the doctrine had a "solid core . . . involv[ing] offenders who, in violation
of a fiduciary duty, participated in bribery or kickback schemes."89
Holding "that § 1346 criminalizes only the bribe-and-kickback core of
the pre-McNally case law," but not the type of undisclosed self-dealing
that formed the basis for Skilling's own conviction, the Court upheld the
statute while remanding the case for further proceedings. 90
While Skilling effectively (albeit controversially) disposed of the
vagueness issue, the opinion failed to address other doctrinal holes. The
majority gave tacit recognition to the fiduciary requirement, at least as a
historical matter, by noting that "[t]he 'vast majority' of the [pre-
McNally] honest-services cases involved offenders who, in violation of a
fiduciary duty, participated in bribery or kickback schemes."9 1 It was left
to Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, to disagree not only with the major-
ity's reading of precedent but also with the assumption that the fiduciary
concept had a clear meaning:
None of the "honest services" cases ... defined the nature and con-
tent of the fiduciary duty central to the "fraud" offense.
There was not even universal agreement concerning the source
of the fiduciary obligation-whether it must be positive state or fed-
eral law . . . or merely general principles, such as the "obligations of
loyalty and fidelity" that inhere in the "employment relationship." 92
In Justice Scalia's view, the fiduciary question remains "the most funda-
mental indeterminacy" of the statute.93
The opinion similarly failed to shed light on the mens rea, harm,
and federalism issues. The only reference to intent came in a discussion
of whether potential defendants would have notice of the statute's appli-
cation to bribery and kickback schemes, where the majority noted that
"the statute's mens rea requirement further blunts any notice concern." 94
To the surprise of many commentators, the Court refused to resolve, or
even to entertain, the intent and harm debates. 95 And by remanding the
companion cases, the Justices avoided any discussion of federalism con-
89. Id. at 2929-30.
90. Id. at 2931.
91. Id. at 2930 (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 2936 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citation
omitted); see generally Buell, supra note 58, at 32 (criticizing the Court for not exploring "the
relationship between fiduciary duties and fraud").
93. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2938.
94. Id. at 2933.
95. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 76, at 268 ("Does it mean intent to deceive on some material
matter? Or . . . does it mean intent to obtain private gain by deceptive and dishonest means?");
Buell, supra note 58, at 47 (noting the "genuine oddity" that the all the opinions "were nearly
silent about mens rea").
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cems, free speech and political expression, the necessity of proving an
underlying violation of state or federal law, and whether there are irrec-
oncilable differences between the honest services theory as applied to
the private and public sectors. Skilling may have resolved a question, but
it was a question few had thought to ask; the key debates remain
unresolved.
III. THE RELEVANCE OF SKILLING TO HEALTH CARE FRAUD
Skilling is widely perceived to have narrowed the scope of honest
services mail and wire fraud, particularly in the private sector.96 Loss of
the ability to prosecute corporate officers and directors for undisclosed
self-dealing, in particular, may be a blow to the DOJ's post-Sarbanes-
Oxley focus on corporate wrongdoing.97 Yet given the prominence of
kickback concerns in health care, the Court's focus on kickbacks and
bribery may well have the paradoxical effect of reinvigorating the prose-
cution of health care intangible rights violations."
This would be a significant change from current practice. Although
the Anti-Kickback Statute can be enforced through a criminal prosecu-
tion, many kickback cases instead are handled through the administra-
tive CMP and exclusion processes. Cases brought under the FCA-
either by DOJ or by private qui tam relators-certainly raise the specter
of large civil settlements, but these civil penalties are limited to situa-
tions in which the government itself has been defrauded.99 In addition to
streamlining kickback cases into a purely criminal track, without the
option of civil resolution, the mail and wire fraud statutes permit crimi-
nal prosecution for private kickback schemes as well as those involving
government funds.
In a typical honest services kickback case, the heightened duty
between the perpetrator and the victim allows the court to find harm to
the victim from the deprivation of honest services; often that harm can
96. Indeed, a bill has been introduced in Congress to restore the crime's applicability to
certain undisclosed self-dealing. See Honest Services Restoration Act, H.R. 1468, 112th Cong. § 2
(2011) (prohibiting undisclosed self-dealing by public officials).
97. Beale, supra note 76, at 270 (noting the need to incentivize corporate executives to better
oversee company behavior).
98. While the Court cited several federal anti-kickback examples in support of the proposition
that the phrase "bribes and kickbacks" gives sufficient notice to potential defendants, it did not
cite the Medicare & Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute. Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2933-34. This may be
due to the relative obscurity of the Anti-Kickback Statute as compared to more widely applicable
federal prohibitions, such as the 18 U.S.C. § 201 prohibition on the bribery of public officials and
witnesses, as well as to the fact that because the current version of the Anti-Kickback Statute dates
only to the late 1970s, there is little pre-McNally case law on point. See Medicare-Medicaid Anti-
Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-142, 91 Stat. 1175 (1977).
99. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006).
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be characterized as the loss of a financial opportunity. In the classic case
of United States v. George,"' for example, a purchasing agent for
Zenith Radio Corporation was convicted of mail fraud based on allega-
tions that he received kickbacks from a cabinet supplier by having the
supplier pay fictitious commission invoices from another company.
While declining to adopt the government's view "that anytime an agent
secretly profits from his agency he has committed criminal fraud,"10 the
court found ample evidence that the agent had in fact injured his
employer.
[His] duty was to negotiate the best price possible for Zenith or at
least to apprise Zenith that [the supplier] was willing to sell his cabi-
nets for substantially less money. . . . There was a very real and tangi-
ble harm to Zenith in losing the discount or losing the opportunity to
bargain with a most relevant fact before it. . . . Here the fraud con-
sisted in [the agent's] holding himself out to be a loyal employee,
acting in Zenith's best interests, but actually not giving his honest and
faithful services, to Zenith's real detriment.102
The harm caused by the kickbacks, then, was the lost opportunity to
bargain with full knowledge and thereby possibly to negotiate a better
price-which was, after all, the essence of the purchasing agent's job.
What types of intangible losses of opportunity might fall within
Skilling's ambit in the health care context? The focus thus far has been
on two distinct categories of health care relationships in which a physi-
cian may function as a fiduciary and thereby owe a duty to provide hon-
est services. First, a physician who violates either the law or a contract
term by giving or accepting kickbacks in connection with services cov-
ered under insurance (including Medicare and Medicaid) might be
viewed as depriving that insurer of honest and faithful services, an argu-
ment that is strengthened by the prevalence of laws and contract terms
prohibiting such behavior. However, courts generally have viewed the
physician-insurer relationship as more contractual than fiduciary in
nature. Far more compelling has been the second argument, that a physi-
cian who pays or accepts kickbacks in connection with providing medi-
cal services thereby deprives patients of honest and faithful services.
The fiduciary relationship at the heart of health care honest services,
then, is most likely the one between physician and patient.
100. 477 F.2d 508, 510 (7th Cir. 1973).
101. Id. at 512.
102. Id. at 512-13. Of course, it is impossible to know whether this hypothetical better bargain
in fact could have been struck. Moreover, the evidence regarding the untoward effects of
kickbacks appears to be mixed. See Mills & Weisberg, supra note 59 at 1406, 1411-15 (noting
that kickbacks are "something of an economic mystery" and reviewing the economics of
commercial kickbacks); Beale, supra note 76, at 268 (noting that some bribes and kickbacks may
be less harmful than some undisclosed self-dealing arrangements).
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A. Limited Case Law to Date
Perhaps surprisingly, few reported cases have addressed the appli-
cability of honest services fraud in the health care context. Indeed, the
two opinions most often cited come to largely opposite conclusions. In
the only federal appellate case directly on point, United States v. Jain, a
psychologist was convicted of violating both the mail fraud and the
Anti-Kickback statutes by accepting payments of $1,000 per month from
a local psychiatric hospital to which he referred patients.10 3 While noti-
nally characterized as compensation for the psychologist's "marketing
services" for the hospital, the government alleged that these payments
were nothing more than kickbacks made in return for his referral of
patients.'I The Eighth Circuit upheld the Anti-Kickback conviction, but
found the government had failed to prove a scheme to defraud under the
mail fraud statute because there was no evidence of tangible harm to any
patient.'05
The evidence in the case established that the hospital had provided
quality psychiatric services and was as good as or better than the alterna-
tive facilities in the area, that all the patients did in fact require hospitali-
zation, and that there had been no financial harm to patients.10 6 The
government argued "that § 1346 encompasses unethical violations of a
private professional's fiduciary duty to provide 'honest services' to his
clients"-here, the failure to disclose these conflicts of interest.'
Drawing on the honest services jurisprudence, however, the Eighth Cir-
cuit emphasized that the defendant must have intended to harm the vic-
tim, and that nondisclosure of information by a private fiduciary must be
material in order to constitute a scheme to defraud.108 Given all indica-
tions that the psychologist had provided high-quality, medically neces-
sary treatment to his patients, there was "no evidence that any patient
would have considered [the psychologist's] relationship with [the hospi-
tal] material if it did not affect the quality or cost of his services to that
patient."' 9 In essence, then, the court adopted the "honest services" lim-
itation discussed above, questioning how the duty could be violated if
the alleged breach did not affect the services that were delivered." 0
103. 93 F.3d. 436, 438 (8th Cir. 1996). Dr. Jain also (unsuccessfully) challenged the jury
instructions concerning mens rea under the Anti-Kickback Statute. Id. at 439-41.
104. Id. at 438-39.
105. Id. at 441-43.
106. Id. at 441.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 442.
109. Id.
110. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. Former prosecutors privately have told the
Author that the lain decision is largely responsible for the federal government's subsequent
failure to bring more health care honest services cases.
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A different conclusion was reached in United States v. Neufeld,'1
in which the government characterized a "consulting arrangement" as
payment from a home infusion company (Caremark) in return for a phy-
sician's referral of his Medicaid patients who suffered from AIDS.
Denying a motion to dismiss the indictment, the District Court agreed
that the honest services theory requires the existence of a fiduciary rela-
tionship between the perpetrator and victim, although it found no such
relationship between Dr. Neufeld and either of the agencies responsible
for administering the Ohio Medicaid program (HHS and the Ohio
Department of Human Services Office of Medicaid).1 2 But the court
concluded there were "elements of a fiduciary relationship" between the
physician and his patients: "[F]iduciary duty encompasses more than
mere disclosure. If Dr. Neufeld solicited bribes or remuneration [sic] in
return for referring his patients to Caremark, as it is alleged, then the
health of his patients was certainly not his only concern. His patients
deserved medical opinions and referrals unsullied by mixed motives.""I
The judge's disapproval of the alleged misbehavior was palpable
throughout the opinion, which characterized the alleged kickbacks as
"an inherently wrongful activity and one of which a physician should
particularly be aware."" 4
In rejecting Dr. Neufeld's defense that he did not receive any per-
111. 908 F. Supp. 491, 493 (S.D. Ohio 1995). Similar to Dr. Jain, Dr. Neufeld also mounted an
unsuccessful challenge to the Anti-Kickback allegations, this time on the grounds of vagueness.
Id. at 493-97.
112. Id. at 499-500; see also N. Shore Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Evanston Hosp. Corp., No. 92 C
6533, 1996 WL 435192, at *6 n.l (N.D. Ill. July 31, 1996) (holding that only patients, and not
competing hospitals, could be the victims of honest services mail fraud, and noting that neither the
doctors nor the hospital "owe[d] the federal government a fiduciary duty with respect to Medicare
claims . . .").
113. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. at 500.
114. Id. at 496. Dr. Neufeld eventually entered a plea bargain, after the litigation had taken a
series of unpredictable turns. See Robert Ruth, Physician Must Serve 3 Months, Pay $5,000,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 4, 2000, at 06C. Soon after trial began in 1996, the judge declared a
mistrial when the prosecutor violated a pretrial order excluding evidence of the homosexual
relationship between Neufeld and his co-defendant, Jon Mickle, a nurse working in Caremark
management. United States v. Neufeld, 949 F. Supp. 555, 556-58 (S.D. Ohio 1996), affd, No. 97-
3159, 149 F.3d 1185 (6th Cir. June 4, 1998). Defendants unsuccessfully moved to dismiss their
indictments on the basis of Double Jeopardy, arguing that the government had elicited the
prohibited testimony in "a deliberate attempt to goad the defense into moving for mistrial." Id. at
558. Finding that "[t]he prosecutor resorted to gratuitous sensationalism to help him win the case,
not to goad a mistrial"-a strategy that led the judge to wonder "whether the government was
using the shock value of defendants' relationship to make up for lack of substance"-the court
denied the motion to dismiss. Id. at 562, 562 n.6. Charges against Mickle eventually were
dismissed, but the government was permitted to re-indict Neufeld. When Neufeld eventually
pleaded guilty to one count of filing false claims in 1999, the judge rejected the probation
department's recommendation of a fine and sentenced him to an additional three months in a
halfway house. See Ruth, supra.
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sonal gain from his patients, the alleged victims of the fraud, the District
Court reaffirmed that the intangible rights doctrine implicates deception
that goes beyond simply defrauding a victim of money or property.1 15
Yet the court also noted that the indictment did in fact allege a flow of
money related to the fraud: the money paid by Caremark to Dr.
Neufeld.116 The court departed from many formulations of the honest
services theory, however, by holding that no misrepresentation of mate-
rial fact would be required: the "bribery and kickbacks solicited by Dr.
Neufeld in the face of a known fiduciary duty to his patients [served as]
sufficient allegations of deceptive conduct .. . to withstand his motion to
dismiss." 1 '
The lessons of Jain and Neufeld are unclear, beyond the commonal-
ity of finding that the physician-patient relationship is, at least in certain
circumstances, sufficient to qualify as a fiduciary relationship under the
honest services theory. 18 It may be tempting to view the Neufeld facts
as more compelling, particularly in light of the District Court's condem-
natory language; however, it is hard to ignore the fact that Dr. Jain
already had been convicted of accepting kickbacks, while Dr. Neufeld's
trial had yet to begin. Similarly, it is easy to appreciate that Dr.
Neufeld's AIDS patients might have been particularly vulnerable to
fraud given their debilitated medical conditions; yet Dr. Jain's patients
were in need of inpatient psychiatric care-were easily as vulnerable a
population (if not more so). Perhaps the decision in Neufeld seemed
obvious at the time, given that Caremark itself recently had pled guilty
to defrauding the federal health care programs by paying physicians to
refer patients to the company."' At a doctrinal level, perhaps the
115. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. at 500-01.
116. Id. at 501. There is, in fact, precedent for this type of tripartite fraud scheme involving the
Anti-Kickback Statute. In recent years numerous pharmaceutical companies have settled
allegations that they inflated the reported average wholesale price ("AWP") of their drugs, on
which Medicare reimbursement previously had been based, far above the price that physicians
actually paid when they purchased the drugs to administer to their patients. This price differential,
called the "spread," often translated to a nice windfall for physicians-or, to prosecutors, a
kickback received in return for using products with particularly high spreads. To the extent the
spread was a kickback, however, it was a rather ingenious one paid to physicians by Medicare
rather than by the manufacturer itself. For more on the AWP theory, see Joan H. Krause,
Regulating, Guiding, and Enforcing Health Care Fraud, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 241,
265-72 (2004).
117. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. at 501.
118. But see infra notesl34-39 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion.
119. See Press Release, Department of Justice, Caremark to Pay $161 Million in Fraud and
Kickback Cases (June 16, 1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/Pre_96/June95/342.
txt.html. Ironically, the contemporaneous prosecution of another physician in the scheme, Dr.
David Brown, was derailed when some of the jurors improperly shared extrinsic information
about Caremark's plea with the rest of the jury. United States v. Brown, 913 F. Supp. 1324, 1326,
1330 (D. Minn. 1996) (granting motion for new trial based on juror misconduct and jury exposure
385
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Neufeld court erred in not analyzing the potential harm to patients, or in
declining to require proof of the physician's intent to deceive in addition
to the breach itself (a point for which the court relied, in fact, on the Jain
District Court opinion that would later be overruled by the Eighth Cir-
cuit).120 Or perhaps the difference is explained by the differential burden
required to survive a motion to dismiss as compared to that required to
overturn a conviction. Regardless, the dissonance has made it difficult to
assess the likely approach to be taken in future honest services health
care kickback cases. 12 1
Other non-kickback cases addressing the honest services/health
care fraud intersection have involved fairly unique circumstances, where
courts seem to believe the contours of the physician's duty were clear. In
United States v. Morris,12 2 for example, an unreported district court
decision, a physician was accused of defrauding a patient into investing
in his medical practice. Finding that the physician's fiduciary duty
encompassed only those "services relating to medical diagnosis and
treatment," however, the court rejected the honest services allegations
because there had been no suggestion that the physician had "compro-
mised" the patient's care.12 3 Although focused on securities fraud and on
the intangible property strain of mail fraud rather than on intangible
rights, the decision in United States v. Willis,124 involving a psychiatrist
who purchased stock based on confidential information disclosed during
a patient's therapy, also may be instructive. During therapy sessions, the
patient disclosed her husband's plans to take over a publicly traded cor-
poration prior to that information being made public; the psychiatrist
to extrinsic information). The Caremark plea bargain also gave rise to an unsuccessful Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") suit by the company's competitors. See
Pharmacare v. Caremark, 965 F. Supp. 1411, 1419 (D. Haw. 1996) (refusing to allow Caremark's
competitors to assert a property interest in patients' rights to honest services from their
physicians).
120. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. at 501 (citations omitted); see United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436,
442 (8th Cir. 1996).
121. At least one court, however, has managed to harmonize the two approaches in a case
involving a physician who ordered unnecessary testing and made false entries in patient records in
order to obtain additional insurance payments; unlike in Jain, the court found that the scheme did
affect the quality and cost of patient care. United States v. Vasquez-Ruiz, No. 00CR1044, 2002
WL 1880127, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2002), rev'd, 502 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 2007).
122. No. CRIM.A. 2:03-00275, 2004 WL 1242736, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. June 4, 2004).
123. Id. at *2-3. The allegations of simple mail/wire fraud were, however, upheld. Courts have
found similar allegations involving attorneys to be actionable, although on slightly different
grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Hausmann, 345 F.3d 952, 954, 956-58 (7th Cir. 2003)
(affirming attorney's sentence for kickback scheme involving payment for referrals to chiropractor
on basis that concealment of kickbacks from clients deprived them of knowing the truth about his
compensation and violated duties set forth in the Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys).
124. 737 F. Supp. 269, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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told his broker, who purchased 13,000 shares of common stock.125 The
court noted that "central to the misappropriation theory of securities
fraud[ ] is a breach of fiduciary or similar duty of trust and confidence. It
is difficult to imagine a relationship that requires a higher degree of trust
and confidence than the traditional relationship of physician and
patient."1 26 Rather than involving kickbacks, however, the specific duty
breached in this case was the duty of confidentiality, a well-defined and
long-recognized duty (particularly in the mental health context).12 7 It is
difficult to discern a clear majority approach from these rather unique
fact patterns. Perhaps the most that can be said is that honest services
fraud remains a viable, albeit underutilized, theory of health care fraud
under certain circumstances.
B. Implications for the Future
To the extent the Skilling opinion functions as an open invitation to
bring more honest services cases based on bribery and kickback allega-
tions in the context of fiduciary relationships, we are likely to see more
health care cases in the future. Of course, these cases will not supplant
more traditional kickback-based health care mail and wire fraud prose-
cutions in which there is evidence that either the kickbacks themselves
or subsequent claims for services have traveled through the mails or
wires.128 In these more straightforward cases, adding an intangible rights
count might be seen as overkill-or at the very least as risking unneces-
sary juror confusion.
Nevertheless, bringing Anti-Kickback cases as honest services mail
and wire fraud does provide certain strategic advantages to the govern-
ment. First, as a litigation strategy, it can be very effective to focus on
the physician-patient relationship as the locus of the misbehavior.' 29 By
characterizing patients rather than a government agency or insurer as the
true victims of the crime, a prosecutor may be able to garner signifi-
125. Id. at 271.
126. Id. at 272.
127. Id. at 274. Yet another oft-cited case, United States v. Garfinkel, turned on a researcher
psychiatrist's duties to a pharmaceutical company sponsor, the Food and Drug Administration,
and his academic employer, rather than to any patients. 29 F.3d 1253, 1254-55, 1259 (8th Cir.
1994).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 379 F. App'x 527, 529-30 (6th Cir. 2010)
(government established that a claim form seeking payment for diagnostic tests performed
pursuant to a kickback arrangement between chiropractors and defendant's company had been
sent through the mail); Baglio v. Baska, 940 F. Supp. 819, 833-34 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (commission
of mail fraud, based on mailing of kickback checks and Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement
checks, alleged (unsuccessfully) as predicate acts for private suit under Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c)-(d)).
129. See FABRIKANT ET AL., supra note 12, § 1.04[2] at 1-30 to 1-31 (describing how "the
presence of patients as victims of the fraud" may increase the chance of success).
387
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
cantly more sympathy from jurors and the general public. As Professor
Pamela Bucy notes, "focus[ing] on the patient as a victim of the fraudu-
lent provider[ ] allows proof of a sad truth: the health care provider, by
virtue of expertise and status, is able to commit fraud by frightening the
ill and trusting patient into parting with money, or more."130 The strat-
egy may be particularly helpful in the absence of obvious physical or
financial harm, as in Jain and Neufeld.
The strategic advantages of mail and wire fraud are evident at the
negotiation stage as well. Recall that the maximum term of imprison-
ment for mail and wire fraud is twenty years in prison, compared to only
five years for a violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute.131 This differ-
ence gives prosecutors an incentive to pursue otherwise run-of-the-mill
health care kickback cases under mail or wire fraud, at least for the pur-
poses of plea negotiations.13 2 Indeed, some already have criticized the
government's decision to use mail and wire fraud in these cases, ques-
tioning whether the charging decision was a ploy "to win long sentences
for publicity-or to offer defendants plea bargains no sane defendant
could refuse?"' 33 As we have seen in other health care fraud contexts,
most notably in cases brought under the FCA, the availability of severe
penalties significantly increases the odds that defendants will settle
rather than take their chances at trial.' 34 Styling more health kickback
cases as honest services mail and wire fraud could well have a similar
effect on plea bargains.
Finally, the language of § 1346 applies not only to mail and wire
fraud but also to the other crimes defined in 18 U.S.C. Chapter 63-
including bank fraud, securities fraud, and for our purposes, the § 1347
health care fraud crime added by HIPAA.13 5 The HIPAA crime applies
to those who "knowingly and willfully execute[ ], or attempt[ ] to exe-
cute, a scheme or artifice . . . to defraud any health care benefit pro-
gram," which includes both public and private plans.13 6 While the
maximum penalty of ten years in prison is lower than that for mail fraud,
130. Pamela H. Bucy, Fraud by Fright: White Collar Crime by Health Care Providers, 67
N.C. L. REV. 855, 937 (1989).
131. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006).
132. See Beale, supra note 76, at 270 n.67.
133. Mills & Weisberg, Honest Services, supra note 74.
134. See, e.g., Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc, supra note 22, at 202-12
(analyzing settlement trends).
135. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1346 (defining the intangible right of honest services "[flor the purposes
of this chapter"), 1347 (health care fraud); see also O'Sullivan, supra note 55, at 30.
136. 18 U.S.C. § 1347(1) (defining offense); id. § 24(b) (defining "health care benefit
program"). The crime also prohibits a scheme to obtain by false and fraudulent pretenses money
or property owned, controlled, or in the custody of a health care benefit program, thus tracking
more traditional forms of mail and wire fraud as well. Id. § 1347(2).
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it rises to twenty years if the violation results in serious bodily injury
and to "any term of years or for life" if a death results.' Despite the
fact that the honest services theory has been applied to this prohibition
since its enactment, § 1347 cases premised on intangible rights viola-
tions (let alone on kickbacks) have not been common. 3 1 Yet Skilling
may invite more of these cases to be brought, particularly in situations in
which the breach of honest services may in some way be linked to seri-
ous harm or death. With the current emphasis on pursuing criminal as
well as civil health care fraud sanctions, this kind of leverage may prove
difficult for prosecutors to resist-and may force changes in the way
that regulatory counsel, as well as the defense bar, approach common
Anti-Kickback concerns.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the limitations that Skilling placed on the intangible rights
doctrine have been viewed as closing the door to many honest services
mail and wire fraud cases, including Jeffrey Skilling's own, this Article
has argued that the case may well lead to additional prosecutions based
on health care kickbacks. There is ample precedent for such cases,
although the theory has thus far not been favored by federal prosecutors.
The litigation and negotiation advantages conferred by mail and wire
fraud charges will dovetail nicely with the Obama Administration's hard
line against fraudulent health care activities.
Yet broader use of the honest services theory in health care kick-
back cases would raise a host of analytical issues, some stemming from
the doctrine's jumbled jurisprudence and others grounded in substantive
health law. Although a topic deserving of far more analysis in another
article, it is worth noting that the characterization of the physician-
patient relationship as a fiduciary one is, perhaps surprisingly, far more
complex than it first appears. One does not have to look far to find broad
descriptions of the fiduciary nature of the relationship; in most discus-
sions it is all but presumed. As Professor Tamar Frankel notes in her
landmark work on Trust and Honesty, "[s]o long as the physician is in
charge of the patient's health, the patient is in no position to question the
physician's decision or to bargain."' Yet some courts have cautioned
that the duty is not all-encompassing: "The breach alleged must contra-
vene the purpose of the parties' relationship. . . . The honest services a
137. Id. § 1347.
138. See, e.g., United States v. Medina, 485 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2007) (§ 1347
prosecution based on kickback scheme).
139. TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA'S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A CROSSROAD
145 (2006).
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patient is entitled to receive from his physician are services related to
medical diagnosis and treatment."14 0
While physicians clearly are entrusted with power over patients,141
a characteristic fiduciary responsibility, other indicia of the relationship
may be absent-the physician, for example, lacks the fiduciary's tradi-
tional control over the beneficiary-patient's money.142 As a legal matter,
the physician's duty to disclose information to patients generally is han-
dled through the state-based law of informed consent rather than through
broad federalized notions of fiduciary duty, and few informed consent
cases or statutes require the disclosure of financial rather than treatment-
related information. 14 3 In the few reported cases involving fiduciary
suits based on physicians' failure to disclose financial interests to
patients (including, interestingly enough, one case involving undisclosed
kickbacks from Caremark), courts have found that the claims sound
more properly in the law of medical malpractice or informed consent.1"
While the fiduciary relationship between physician and patient may not
exactly be a fiction, at present the characterization may well be more
normative than descriptive in nature.
The confusion surrounding the physician's duty is more than a the-
oretical issue: It has direct implications for the elements of honest ser-
vices fraud in kickback cases, specifically for the nature of the required
deception. Current case law supports several approaches. First, prosecu-
tors might argue that the very nature of a kickback, given or accepted in
violation of a clear statutory prohibition, is sufficient to establish decep-
140. United States v. Morris, No. CRIM.A. 2:03-00275, 2004 WL 1242736, at *2 (S.D. W. Va.
June 4, 2004) (emphasis added).
141. TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDuciARY LAw 43 (2011).
142. See Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent, supra note 1, at 268-69 (discussing
debate over fiduciary status). Consideration of the physician's fiduciary status is further
complicated by the distinct but related issue of when a physician is considered to be a fiduciary
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461. See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000) (holding that "mixed
eligibility decisions" by health maintenance organization physicians are not fiduciary acts under
ERISA).
143. See Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent, supra note 1, at 267-78, 339-41
(discussing doctrine).
144. See, e.g., Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496, 505 (Ill. 2000) (breach of fiduciary duty
claim, based on allegation that physician failed to disclose financial incentives in his relationship
with health maintenance organization, was duplicative of medical negligence claim); D.A.B. v.
Brown, 570 N.w.2d 168 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (class action fiduciary suit based on physician's
acceptance of kickbacks from Caremark in violation of Minnesota law sounded instead in medical
malpractice). Virtually the only case to the contrary, and then only tepidly, is Moore v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (holding that patient stated a cause of action for
either failure to obtain informed consent or breach of fiduciary duty based on physician's failure
to disclose plan to develop a patentable, commercially viable cell line from patient's cells).
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tion per se." A second variant would argue that to the extent kickbacks
are usually disguised as legitimate forms of payment, such as the so-
called "consulting" and "marketing" fees at issue in Neufeld and Jain,
such kickbacks are presumptively deceptive unless proven otherwise." 6
In contrast, a third approach would extrapolate from the "honest ser-
vices" limitation to argue that in the absence of a clear duty to disclose
(rather than merely not to engage in) a kickback under fiduciary law or
informed consent, violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute will not sup-
port an honest services prosecution unless there is additional evidence of
harm to the patient-if not tangible harm, at least proof that the physi-
cian's decisionmaking (i.e., the services owed) was in fact influenced in
a way that could have affected the patient's treatment.1 47
No clear pathway is obvious from existing law. The first two theo-
ries are attractive bright-line rules, but would come close to converting
all kickback violations involving the mails or wires into per se mail and
wire fraud-an approach that appears to duplicate the traditional mail
and wire crimes as well as the Anti-Kickback Statute itself. The third
approach, by contrast, may perhaps be a truer reading of the doctrine,
but likely will be found wanting by jurists who believe the disclosure
duties imposed on physicians under current health law are incomplete.
Understanding the source and scope of the physician's fiduciary duty,
and the way in which a breach of that duty may establish an illegal
deception, is crucial. A deeper analysis of these issues-and of the
implications for substantive health law should honest services kickback
cases become more prevalent and should federal judges begin to ques-
tion the contours of physician duties traditionally left to the states-
clearly is in order.
145. Cf United States v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491, 496 (S.D. Ohio 1995) ("Taking bribes for
referrals . . . is an inherently wrongful activity . . . .").
146. The facts of Black v. United States, one of the companion cases vacated in light of
Skilling, involved similar allegations of bonuses disguised as unwarranted "noncompetition" fees
to a controlling shareholder. 130 S. Ct. 2963, 2966-67 (2010).
147. See United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 442 (8th Cir. 1996) ("But when the client was not
harmed because the breach did not affect the services rendered, how has the client's right to
'honest services' been violated?"); Coffee, Modern Mail Fraud, supra note 59, at 452.
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